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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
SALES
Automobile Warranties. A defective switch in a new automobile
started a fire that destroyed the entire machine. Under the standard
warranty given by all automobile manufacturers, the dealer's only obli-
gation was to supply a new switch. By so deciding, Norway v. Root1
illustrated the worthlessness of the standard warranty. But the import-
ance of the case lies in the Washington court's intimation that it might
invalidate disclaimers of implied warranty in automobile sales were the
issue squarely presented.
The plaintiff bought a new Lincoln from the defendant dealer, who
gave him the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers
Association:2
Dealer warrants to Purchaser (except as hereinafter provided) each
part of each Ford Motor Company product sold by Dealer to Purchaser
to be free under normal use and service from defects in material and
workmanship .... Dealer's obligation under this warranty is limited to
replacement of... such parts as shall be returned to Dealer with trans-
portation charges prepaid and as shall be acknowledged by Dealer to be
defective.... This warranty is expressly in lieu of all other warranties,
express or implied, and of all other obligations or liabilities on the part
of the Dealer .... I
Within the prescribed time and mileage limitations, the car caught fire
while sitting in the plaintiff's garage overnight. The plaintiff's insurer
reimbursed him for his $2,500 loss. Considering itself subrogated to his
claim for breach of warranty,' the insurer brought an action against the
1 158 Wash. Dec. 85, 361 P2d 162 (1961).2 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960).
3 Norway v. Root, 158 Wash. Dec. 85, 86, 361 P.2d 162 (1961).4 The Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the insurance company
was subrogated to the rights of its insured, but added that they entertained substantial
doubt on this point. Apparently no case has explicitly considered subrogation by an
automobile insurer in an action for breach of warranty, although it was allowed without
discussion in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W2d
449 (Iowa 1961).
The equitable principle of subrogation applies wherever an indemnity policy is in-
volved. 6 APPLEMAN, INsURA cE LAW & PRAcTIcE § 4051 & n.5 (1942, Supp. 1961).
Thus subrogation is permitted under policies covering automobile collision and theft.
Bader v. Marlin, 160 Wash. 460, 295 Pac. 160 (1931) (collision) (dictum) ; Barnett v.
London Assur. Corp., 138 Wash. 673, 245 Pac. 3 (1926) (theft) ; 6 APPLEmAN. op. cit.
supra, § 4051 & n.3 (1942, Supp. 1961). Statutory authorization (Washington insurance
statutes do not mention subrogation), inclusion in the policy of a subrogation provision,
or assignment of the insured's rights aids the insurer's case, but is not essential if the
insurer has paid the loss. 6 APPLEiXAN, op. cit. supra. §§ 4052, 4053 (1942, Supp. 1961).
Nor is it necessary that the subrogated claim sound in tort. Consolidated Freightways,
Inc. v. Moore, 38 Wn.2d 427, 229 P.2d 882 (1951), held the doctrine equally applicable
to contract claims, which would seem to include claims based on express warranty.
Dworak v. Tempel, 18 Ill. App. 2d 225, 152 N.E2d 197 (1958), aff'd, 17 Ill. 2d 181, 161
N.E. 2d 258 (1959), allowed subrogation in an action based on a dramshop statute, which
imposes a form of strict liability similar to that imposed by the law of implied warranty.
So far subrogation appears to be proper. But suretyship law suggests an analogy that
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dealer, who cross-complained against the manufacturer. The trial court
found that a defective starter switch had caused the fire and gave
judgment to the plaintiff and, on the cross-complaint, to the dealer.
The plaintiff's theory was that the dealer had warranted to replace
all parts that were defective, not only when the car was delivered, but
also when it was returned. He relied on a single case, from Massa-
chusetts.5 To the extent that it supported the plaintiff's position, the
case had been recently overruled.'
Two Washington cases have interpreted this kind of warranty agree-
ment to mean that the seller's replacement of parts defective on delivery
completely fulfills his warranty obligation, irrespective of whether the
defective part has produced consequential damage. Crandall Engineer-
ing Co. v. Winslow Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co.' held that in an
action for the purchase price the buyer of drydock hauling machinery
could not recover on a counterclaim the cost of dismantling a defective
gear and installing a new one. The 1960 case of Dimoff v. Ernie Majer,
Inc.' held that the seller of a Ford truck was not liable under the
standard warranty for loss incurred by the buyer when a crimped fuel
line greatly increased gasoline consumption. Citing the Crandall case,
the court said that the warranty terms "precluded recovery for con-
sequential damages suffered because of a defective part."9 Courts of
other jurisdictions similarly interpret this kind of warranty."
may produce difficulty for the automobile insurer when the owner's claim is based on
warranty. A surety is subrogated to the obligee's claim against a third party only when
the surety's rights have greater equity that the third party's. SIMPsoN, SupzrYsaip 220
(1950). So where the third party has acted neither negligently nor in bad faith, the
surety is denied subrogation. Meyers v. Bank of America, 11 Cal. 2d 92, 77 P.2d 1084
(1938). The non-negligent automobile manufacturer in the principal case may be able
similarly to defeat the insurer's claim to subrogation. At least he has a better chance
than would someone who had deliberately or negligently caused the fire in the auto-
mobile.
5 American Locomotive Co. v. National Wholesale Grocery Co., 226 Mass. 314, 115
N.E. 404 (1917). There the seller warranted to replace parts that broke "because of"
defective material or workmanship. While ambiguous, this warranty is distinguishable
from the current automobile warranty in which the seller promises in effect to replace
parts that contain defects in material or workmanship.
6 Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc.. 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E2d 107 (1960). In that case,
as in Norway, the plaintiff's car was destroyed by a fire of which defective wiring was
the cause. The court held that the express warranty did not cover the loss and that
implied warranties had been disclaimed.
7 188 Wash. 1, 61 P2d 136 (1936).
8 55 Wn2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
9 Id. at 388, 347 P.2d at 1058.
10 Sharpless Separator Co. v. Domestic Electric Refrigerator Corp., 61 F.2d 499 (3d
Cir. 1932) ; Morris & Co. v. Power Mfg. Co., 17 F2d 689 (6th Cir. 1927) ; Maryland
Cas Co. v. Independent Metal Prods. Co., 99 F. Supp. 862 (D. Neb. 1951) ; Whitaker v.
Cannon Mills Co. 132 Conn. 434. 45 A.2d 120 (1945) ; Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
United Aircraft Corp., 163 A.2d 582 (Del. 1960) ; Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340
Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960); Fealk v. Economy Baler Co., 223 Mich. 45, 193
N.W. 787 (1923) ; Chiquita Mining Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 60 Nev. 142. 104
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Reading the warranty as applicable to parts defective on return,
the plaintiff in Norway implicitly distinguished damages caused by
defective parts according to whether the initial defect produced injury
to other parts or to something else. Accordingly, only the second kind
of injury would be consequential within the Crandall and Dimoff cases.
But the dealer only warranted each part to free from defects in material
and workmanship. If a part is defective solely because of a fire, from
whatever cause, the defect has no connection with the material or
workmanship of that part. Since the part remains as free from the
defects warranted against as it was on the day of manufacture, the
warranty is inapplicable by any reasonable construction. As a result,
the plaintiff had no basis for distinguishing consequential damage to
other parts of the car so as to take it out of the rule of the Crandall
and Dhnoff cases. Because the plaintiff did not attack those cases, but
claimed instead that they did not apply, the Washington Supreme Court
could only reverse the judgment which the trial court had rendered in
favor of the plaintiff.
Significantly, however, the court added sua sponte:
We are aware that an express warranty of this character, which pur-
ports to be a disclaimer of all implied warranties, is under severe
attack.... The very recent case of Henningsen v. Bloom field Motors,
Ic., 1960, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, contains the best-documented
criticism we have found. It brands the attempted disclaimer of an
implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising
therefrom as so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudica-
tion of its invalidity.
We are, therefore, at some pains to make it clear that in this particu-
lar case the... [plaintiff] makes no claim based on an implied warranty,
but relies on the express warranty relative to defective parts ....
(Italics added.) 1'
The Henningsen case arose out of the sale of a new Plymouth with
the standard warranty. Ten days after the sale, the steering mechanism
broke while the buyer's wife was driving, and the car veered into a
brick wall. She sued the dealer and the manufacturer to recover
P.2d 191 (1940) ; Lyons v. Benson, 12 N.J. Misc. 468, 172 AtI. 792 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ;
Bell Bros. v. Robinson, 5 Ohio App. 454 (1916) ; Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi &
Sons, 193 Pa. Super. 1, 162 A2d 263 (1960) ; Bechtold v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 321
Pa. 423, 184 Aft. 49 (1936); Hill & MacMillan v. Taylor, 304 Pa. 18, 155 Atl. 103
(1931); Lee v. Pauly Motor Truck Co., 179 Wis. 139. 190 N.W. 819 (1922). Compare
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
11 Norway v. Root, 158 Wash. Dec. 85, 87, 361 P.2d 162, 163-64 (1961). The reluc-
tance of the Washington court to enforce disclaimers is illustrated in Hatten Machinery
Co. v. Brunch, 159 Wash. Dec. 773. 370 P.2d 601 (1962). There a disclaimer agreement
was denied effect for lack of proof that the agent who signed the agreement had author-
ity to negotiate changes in his principal's oral contract.
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damages for personal injuries. Her husband joined to recover his con-
sequential losses. The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed a judgment for the plaintiffs. This was a bold and important
decision, grounded on three new principles of case law: (1) Despite
lack of privity, manufacturers of automobiles are liable to ultimate
buyers for breach of implied warranty. (2) Despite lack of privity,
automobile manufacturers and dealers are liable for breach of implied
warranty to members of the family and household of the buyer and to
others who use the automobile with his consent. (3) Automobile manu-
facturers and dealers cannot disclaim liability for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. 2
There is a considerable literature on privity and disclaimer of
warranty in the automobile industry. Professor Gillam has thoroughly
analyzed the relevant cases and secondary authorities which appeared
before 1959.11 The Henningsen case itself is well-documented, and it
has been noted thirteen times.1 4 This note, therefore, treats these issues
summarily.
It is noteworthy that the Hlenningsen case is the first appellate case
in which the automobile industry has used the warranty disclaimer as
a defense to a claim for personal injuries." The New Jersey court held
12 A few months before the Heningsen decision, General Motors Corp. v. Dodson,
338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960), affirmed a judgment against a manufacturer in a
breach of warranty action, despite the lack of privity between manufacturer and buyer.
The court, however, did not base its decision only on the theory that advertisements
constituted express warranties to ultimate buyers. The decision also turned on the fraud
exception to the privity requirement, since the severe personal injuries of the driver were
caused by the locking of defective brakes. These were of a type that frequently mal-
functioned, as the manufacturer knew. Significantly, the manufacturer in that case did
not raise any defense based on the disclaimer clause.
While the Henningsen result is novel, it is no longer unique. Relying on the reasoning
of the Henningsen and Dodson. cases, the Iowa court has held that there need be no
privity between manufacturer and buyer and that the disclaimer clause in the automobile
warranty is void. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d
449 (Iowa 1961). This case is singular in that the plaintiff sued to recover damages for
property loss rather than personal injuries, and nevertheless the court embraced the new
doctrine in order to sustain him.
The Hennhngsen case was also relied on in Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78
(D. Hawaii 1961), which is quite as famous as the New Jersey case. The plaintiff in
Chapnman borrowed a hula skirt from her aunt (by marriage) and wore it to a dance.
Cigarette butts on the floor ignited the skirt, which burned rapidly and intensely. In
an action for breach of implied warranty against the retail seller of the skirt, the court
repudiated the requirement of privity between the seller and persons using the product
with the buyer's consent. The decision rested on an analysis of the UNmIoam SALEs AcT,
the common law trend away from privity, and the public policy arguments against the
requirement.
13GILLAM, PRoDucTs LIABInITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1960).
14 12 BAYLOR L. RV. 345 (1960) ; 46 CORNELL L.Q. 607 (1961) ; 74 HAnv. L. lv.
630 (1961) ; 59 MICH. L. Rv. 467 (1961) ; 39 N.C.L. REv. 299 (1961) ; 36 NoTRE DA&E
LAW. 233 (1961) ; 14 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 829 (1960) ; 12 SYRAcusE L. Rv. 123 (1960);
13 S.C.L.Q. 131 (1960) ; 39 TEXAS L. REv. 694 (1961) ; 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 658 (1961);
38 U. DET. L.J. 218 (1960) ; 14 VAxD. L. REv. 681 (1961).
15 See GILLAM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 192.
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the disclaimer to be void as against public policy, reasoning that since
imposition of an agreement so favorable to the seller results from
the overwhelmingly superior bargaining power of the united manu-
facturers, the law ought to regard the agreement as unfairly procured,
just as if it were obtained by overreaching or concealment. In fact, the
court also found that the (customary) contract form does conceal the
disclaimer by de-emphasizing its presence and extent.
Although disclaimer clauses are imposed unfairly, it seems unlikely
that Washington cases allowing such clauses 6 would be overruled for
that reason alone. If disclaimers were declared invalid for a given
industry, the result would be to distribute the social cost of defective
products among all buyers," whether or not they wanted to assume
that cost. Disclaimers usually accompany sales of automobiles, ma-
chinery and appliances. Any buyer wanting to protect himself against
loss from defects in such products can obtain insurance to cover these
risks, and no one pays for that protection except those who so choose.
On the other hand, absolute liability of manufacturers would ensure
better quality control. 8 On balance, it is far from certain that dis-
claimer clauses really offend public policy.
The Henningsen opinion is more convincing on the privity question,
which, of course, was not involved in the Norway case. In the view of
the New Jersey court, manufacturers cannot develop a mass market
through advertising and merchandising techniques directed toward the
ultimate consumer or user and, at the same time, justly escape liability
for defective products by claiming that they have no contractual rela-
tionship with the people injured. As Professor Vold makes clear,"9
certain implied warranties, notably that of merchantability, have been
created by law on grounds of public policy and quite independently of
the sales contract. Analytically and historically they are forms of
absolute tort liability and ought, therefore, to protect everyone who is
expectably injured by the defects warranted against. To require privity
here is to oppose fundamentally the notion of implied warranty'
'G The Washington disclaimer of warranty cases are cited and several are discussed
in Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Com-
liercial Code (pts. 1,2,4) 35 WASH. L. Rnv. 412, 426-428, 617, 628-632 (1960), 36
WASH. L. REv. 440, 472-474 (1961). The American cases validating automobile war-
ranty disclaimers are collected in GnLAM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 176 n.344.
17 GrLLA, op. cit. supra note 13, at 196-210.
18 Llewellyn, On Warranty of Qudlity, & Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341 (1937).
10 VOLD, SALES § 93 (2d ed. 1959).20 Note, however, that the requirement of privity now has little effect in Washington
as between manufacturer and ultimate buyer. Under WASH. R.P.P.P. 14 (a), a defend-
ant may implead a third party "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." Since the manufacturer's and the dealer's warranties
1962]
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In the past, the Washington court has led in the relaxation of the
privity requirement. In Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,2 it early recognized
an exception for defective foods, and the leading case of Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co.2 (relied on in Henningsen) was the first to hold an auto-
mobile manufacturer liable for breach of express warranty. In that
case the plaintiff lost his eye when it was struck by shattering glass
from a windshield advertised as shatter-proof. Note that both cases
involved personal injuries. Washington has now abandoned privity in
cases involving fraud, negligence or dangerous instrumentalities."3 The
breadth of these exceptions recalls the status of the privity rule in
negligence cases in 1916. During that year Mr. Justice (then Chief
Judge) Cardozo wrote the celebrated opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,2 where he created a new rule out of previous exceptions to
the privity requirement. The courts of New Jersey," Tennessee" and
Iowa 7 have already applied Cardozo's method to warranty cases.
Especially in a personal injuries case, the Washington court might
very well do likewise.
The Henningsen case conforms with the Uniform Commercial Code
in two respects and goes beyond it in two other." Section 2-318
provides an illimitable extension of warranties to members of the
buyer's household or family and to guests that may expectably use the
goods. The Code, however, remains neutral with respect to the develop-
ing case law on the warranty requirement of privity between manu-
facturer and ultimate buyer. 9 Section 2-719 (1) allows limitation of the
buyer's remedies, as to replacement of defective parts. But subsection
three prohibits unconscionable limitation of warranty liability for
consequential damages. It specifies that limitation of damages for
personal injuries (but not commercial losses) is prima facie unconscion-
contain identical terms, a dealer who is sued by a buyer can bring the manufacturer into
the action, and the dealer has every reason to do so (unless it is an insolvent corpora-
tion). Except that the superceded process of cross-complaint was used, that is just what
happened in the Norway case. If the manufacturer is a foreign corporation, it may not
be subject to the jurisdiction of Washington. In this case, however, the buyer proceed-
ing directly would have no greater success than the dealer seeking impleader.
2175 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
22 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd after retrial, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P2d 1090
(1934). Compare Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wn2d 180, 100 P.2d 30 (1940).2 3 Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wn.2d 385, 347 P2d 1056 (1960).
24217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).2 5 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A-2d 69 (1960).
21 General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960). See note
12 supra.
27 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa
1961). See note 12 upra.
28 See generally Cosway, supra note 16.
2 UN woRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-318, Comment 3.
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able." Both the Norway and the Henningsen cases are thus consistent
with Section 2-719, although the reasoning of the New Jersey case does
not depend on the fact of injury to the person.
The law of warranty is obviously in flux, resolving conflicts between
the elements it derives from tort and contract. The observable trend
in favor of buyers raises the further problem of the "third-party victim"
-one who sustains damage because of defects in the product of a
total stranger. The implied warranty of merchantability should in
theory extend to him equally with the buyer and his household, since
the law imposes this warranty to protect the public, rather than to
implement a sales contract. Where injury to the public is a foreseeable
consequence of a breach, other implied warranties and warranties based
on sellers' representations seem likewise open to extension.
Finally, the changing state of warranty law calls attention to the
relationship between disclaimers and privity. If, in the same situation,
one seller is allowed to defend with the disclaimer clause and another
with the privity requirement, then the first seller escapes liability
because there is a contract and the second because there is not a con-
tract. This unfairness can be avoided by confining the disclaimer
defense to situations where there is privity of contract."
DANIEL B. RITTER
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Mortgage on Shifting Stock of Merchandise-Mortgagors Duty
to Account. Washington businessmen using mortgages on shifting
stocks of merchandise as a security arrangement received encourage-
ment from United States Rubber Co. v. Young,' that more liberal agree-
ments and procedures may be allowed. However, by failing to expressly
overrule certain prior judicial restrictions on the use of this type of
security, the Washington Supreme Court has left some unnecessary
confusion to be resolved in the future.'
The case arose when U.S. Rubber Co., a creditor, sought the appoint-
ment of a receiver for Glen Young's sporting-goods store. The purchase
20 See also UNiroas COmxERciAL CODE § 2-302 (authorizing refusal to enforce un-
conscionable or clauses generally).
31 Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922). Pelletier v.
Brown Bros. Chevrolet & Oldsmobile, Inc., 164 N.Y.S2d 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) ;
Ford Motor Co. v. Switzer, 140 Va. 383, 125 S.E. 209 (1924). But cf. Odom v. Ford
Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).
157 Wn2d 686, 359 P.2d 315 (1961).2 For a brief history and development of the Washington position see Kerr, Chattel
Mortgages on Shifting Stocks of Goods in Washington, 11 WAsH. L. R v. 199 (1936).
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